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Abstract:
This article was presented at “Guilty Minds: A Virtual Conference on Mens Rea and
Criminal Justice Reform” at Arizona State University’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.
Under the willful blindness doctrine widely employed in federal criminal prosecutions,
courts expand a statutory “knowledge” or “willfulness” requirement to encompass “willful
blindness” or “deliberate indifference.” The WB doctrine bridges the gap between recklessness and
knowledge, treating a subcategory of recklessness cases as if they were knowledge cases—namely,
those cases in which defendant is not merely aware of a substantial risk that the incriminating fact
exists, but also deliberately avoided confirmation of the incriminating fact. This article closely
examines different versions of the WB doctrine as well as its application in recent cases. Careful
analysis suggests that the doctrine, although justifiable in the abstract as a matter of principle and
policy, is highly problematic in practice. With respect to the first element of WB, courts offer little
guidance about how much suspicion defendant must harbor that the incriminating fact exists. With
respect to the second element, courts give varying and often inadequate explanations of the meaning
of “conscious” or “deliberate avoidance” or “deliberate ignorance.” For example, they often do not
resolve whether a simple failure to inquire into the facts suffices.
I conclude that courts should either significantly narrow the doctrine or, better, suspend its
use until empirical research demonstrates that it can be accurately, consistently, and fairly
implemented. More generally, there is a compelling need for more empirical study of how ordinary
people and legally trained actors understand such mens rea terms as knowledge, belief,
recklessness, willful blindness, and deliberate avoidance.

A.

Introduction

Under the willful blindness (WB) doctrine widely employed in federal criminal
prosecutions, courts expand a statutory “knowledge” or “willfulness” requirement to encompass
“willful blindness” or “deliberate indifference.” For example, courts conclude that for drug
possession or distribution crimes that explicitly require knowing possession of the illegal drugs, a
I received very helpful feedback on this draft from participants at the Arizona State University Conference
on Mens Rea Reform, September 2020; the Southern California Criminal Justice Scholars Roundtable; and
a workshop at UC, Irvine School of Law. Special thanks to Eric Blumenson, Dan Burk, Jennifer Chacon,
Kevin Cole, Kaaryn Gustafson, Jeff Helmreich, Song Richardson, Alex Sarch, Francis Shen, Katie Tinto,
and Gideon Yaffe. I thank Arjay Parhar, UC Irvine School of Law ’21, for helpful research assistance.
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defendant can be convicted merely upon proof that he or she was willfully blind to whether the
item possessed contained an illegal drug. (Suppose E pays money to D to transport a sealed box to
F, and D knows that both E and F deal in drugs.) The doctrine has been applied to a wide range of
other federal crimes, including smuggling firearms, medical insurance fraud and other types of
fraud, identity theft, child pornography, transporting stolen property, money laundering, tax
evasion, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, environmental crimes, and failure to pay child support,
and also conspiracy to engage in a variety of offenses. The Supreme Court recently endorsed the
WB doctrine in a noncriminal context, holding in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A. 1 that active
inducement of patent infringement requires either knowledge that the induced acts amount to patent
infringement or WB to that fact. The Court’s endorsement is likely to spur wider use of the doctrine
in other civil and criminal law contexts.
The WB doctrine has other names, including “willful ignorance,” “deliberate indifference,”
“conscious avoidance,” and the “ostrich” instruction. All versions contain at least two elements.
Roughly speaking, WB is equivalent to:
(1) D’s suspicion that the incriminating fact exists, plus
(2) D’s deliberate avoidance of the truth of that fact.
In Model Penal Code terms, WB requires recklessness 2 plus a culpable motive; recklessness alone
is insufficient for WB, but knowledge is not necessary. Thus, WB picks out a subcategory of cases
in which a defendant was reckless with respect to an incriminating fact and permits conviction of
such defendants so long as the statute also permits conviction of a defendant who actually knew
that the incriminating fact exists or was true.
This article closely examines different versions of the WB doctrine as well as its
application in recent cases. I conclude that the doctrine, although justifiable in the abstract as a
matter of principle and policy, is highly problematic in practice. Courts should either significantly
narrow the doctrine or, better, suspend its use until empirical research demonstrates that it can be
accurately, consistently, and fairly implemented, either in general or in specific legal contexts.
Another problematic feature of WB doctrine is the largely unexamined assumption that
judicial 3 expansion of an explicit statutory knowledge requirement to encompass WB is consistent
563 U.S. 754 (2011). Unfortunately, Global-Tech glosses over significant differences in judicial approaches
to willful blindness. For example, United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007 (en banc), does not
actually require proof that the defendant deliberately avoided the truth. Nor does the Model Penal Code. See
note 30= infra.
2
An actor is reckless with respect to a fact if, inter alia, he or she consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the fact is true. MPC § 2.02 (2)(c).
3
Sometimes, but not often, the statute itself explicitly recognizes WB as a basis of liability. See, e.g., Minn.
Crim. Stat. § 609.671, subd. 2 (a) Definition of knowing [for environmental crimes]: “Knowledge may also
1
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with Congressional (or state legislative) intent and history and with statutory language. For the
purposes of this paper, I do not explore this important issue of legitimacy and legality, but instead
focus on the justifiability of WB doctrine as a matter of criminal law principles and policies.
The article is divided into the following sections: theoretical and policy justifications of
WB; conceptual issues about the meaning of knowledge and belief; different versions of WB;
problems with WB as applied in recent cases; analysis; and conclusion. The last two sections
highlight some important lessons, including the need for more empirical study of how ordinary
people and legally trained actors understand such mens rea terms as knowledge, belief,
recklessness, willful blindness, and deliberate avoidance.
B.

Theoretical and policy justifications of WB

In theory and as a matter of policy, WB is a justifiable doctrine. Or more precisely, some
version of WB is justifiable. This paper will later examine some variations that may be more or less
justifiable, but this section focuses on the larger picture.
Consider first the distinction between an actor committing a criminal act knowing that a
material circumstance of the crime is true and another actor committing the same act while only
reckless about whether the circumstance is true. Suppose D1 and D2 both choose to transport a
package that actually contains illegal drugs, but D1 believes it is almost certain that the package
contains drugs while D2 believes there is only a 20% chance that the package contains drugs. All
else being equal, D1 is more culpable than D2, because D1 consciously disregarded what D1
perceived to be a relatively high probability that the incriminating fact is true, while D2 only
disregarded what D2 perceived to be a much smaller probability that the fact is true. 4 Put

be established by evidence that the person took affirmative steps to shield the person from relevant
information.”
4
Alexander Sarch provides a helpful formulation of the “Comparative confidence principle” that underlies
this distinction:
For any two people who commit the actus reus of a crime, if they are identical in all respects except
that one is more confident in the truth of the inculpatory proposition, p, than the other, then … the
person with the greater degree of [subjective] confidence in p is more culpable than the one with the
lesser degree of confidence in p.
Sarch, Criminally Ignorant: Why the Law Pretends We Know What We Don’t, p. 88 (Oxford 2019). See also
Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad Character”?, 6 Buffalo Crim.
L. Rev. 219, 251 (2002).
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differently, D1’s willingness to act despite a much higher risk of committing a criminal act
ordinarily displays a greater level of culpability or responsibility for purposes of the criminal law. 5
The WB doctrine bridges the gap between recklessness and knowledge, by treating a
subcategory of recklessness cases as if they were knowledge cases. WB permits conviction for a
crime requiring knowledge as to a material element based on a somewhat less culpable cognitive
mental state—defendant’s awareness of a risk that the incriminating fact exists, rather than what
knowledge usually requires, namely, awareness of a near certainty that the fact exists. However,
WB also requires a more culpable mental state or motive than plain-old-vanilla recklessness
requires: WB requires, not just that defendant knowingly took a risk that an incriminating fact exists
(and that it was unjustifiable and grossly unreasonable for defendant to take that risk), but also that
defendant deliberately avoided confirmation of the incriminating fact.

There are different ways of specifying the type of culpability displayed by an actor who proceeds despite
awareness that an incriminating fact might be true. For example, “a cognitive emphasis [reflected in the
MPC’s knowledge/recklessness distinction] is easier to justify under a choice-based retributive account than
under a character-based account.” Simons, Punishment and Blame for Culpable Indifference, 58 Inquiry 143,
147 (2015). Thus, Yaffe argues that “we care about an agent’s mental states, and the deliberative processes
they guide, when assessing his responsibility because, thanks to them, his actions manifest his culpabilityrelevant values. In particular, thanks to the agent’s mental states, his actions manifest the evaluative weight
that he gives to his own interests in comparison to the interests of other people.” Gideon Yaffe, The Point of
Mens Rea: The Case of Willful Ignorance, 12 Crim L & Phil 19, 25-26 (2018) (emphasis omitted). Other
variants of this quality of will view include Sarch, supra; Simons, supra; Westen, "An Attitudinal Theory of
Excuse." Law & Phil. 25, no. 3 (2006): 289-375. For some doubts that the culpability of acting knowingly
always exceeds that of acting recklessly, see Simons, id.
This paper focuses on culpability with respect to a circumstance element of an offense. WB could,
in theory, also apply to culpability with respect to a result element (such as causing a death in homicide).
However, courts have not actually applied WB in this context. Nevertheless, the concept of “extreme
indifference” or “depraved heart” performs an analogous function. See Simons, id. at 159-160 (offering
example in which an arsonist turns off the video feed in a house that she is about to burn that would inform
her that the victim is likely to die, because she does not want to know).
5
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Many criminal law scholars 6 (including yours truly 7) have endorsed WB, albeit in different
formulations and for different reasons. 8 In principle, the doctrine offers the promise of improving
the typical modern hierarchy of mental states reflected in the MPC and many modern codes
(purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence) by giving more weight to noncognitive aspects
of criminal culpability. MPC recklessness and MPC knowledge differ mainly, and perhaps only,
along the cognitive dimension—i.e., in the degree of risk that defendant consciously adverts to. But
WB adds a noncognitive criterion—namely, defendant’s reason or motive for not confirming her
suspicion that she might in fact 9 be violating the criminal law. If defendant had a culpable reason
See Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351 (1992); Douglas
Husak & Craig Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal Culpability” Thesis, 1994 Wis. L.
Rev. 29; David Luban, Contrived ignorance. 87 Geo. L.J. 957 (1999); Alan Michaels, Acceptance: The
Missing Mental State, 71 S. Cal. L.Rev. 953 (1998); Ira Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate
Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. Crim. L. & Crimin. 191 (1990); Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, supra;
Sarch, Willful ignorance in law and morality, Philos. Compass 2018; 13:e12490.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12490; Sarch, Willful ignorance, culpability and the criminal law, 88 St. John’s
Law Review 1023 (2014).
Charlow endorses this formulation:
A person is wilfully ignorant of a material fact if the person (1) is aware of very good information
indicating that the fact exists; (2) almost believes the fact exists; and (3) deliberately avoids learning
whether the fact exists (4) with a conscious purpose to avoid the criminal liability that would result
if he or she actually knew the fact.
Id. at 1429.
Husak and Callender state: “[A] defendant is wilfully ignorant of an incriminating proposition p
when he is suspicious that p is true, has good reason to think p true, fails to pursue reliable, quick, and
ordinary measures that would enable him to learn the truth of p, and, finally, has a conscious desire to remain
ignorant of p in order to avoid blame or liability in the event that he is detected.” 1994 Wis. L. Rev. at 41.
The authors conclude that WB defendants should be required to take reasonable steps to learn the relevant
facts but should be punished less than knowing defendants. Id. at 68-69.
Sarch argues that the WB doctrine should require proof that the defendant, suspecting that an
inculpatory proposition is true, breached a duty to inform himself or herself before acting. See Sarch,
Criminally Ignorant, Ch. 4.
According to Yaffe, omitting inquiry that would have disclosed knowledge sometimes manifests
the same degree of disregard of others’ interests as is manifested in knowingly acting criminally. Yaffe, supra.
For a critique of Yaffe, see Alexander Sarch, Ignorance Lost: A Reply to Yaffe on the Culpability of Willful
Ignorance, 12 Crim. L. & Phil. 107 (2018).
7
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 500-502 (1992); Simons, Should the Model Penal
Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 179, 187 (2003). One rationale for treating
WB the same as knowledge is a counterfactual test: the WB actor most likely would have proceeded with his
action even if he had had knowledge. See Simons, Culpable Indifference, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. at 264-267;
Michaels, supra.
8
Recently, a number of philosophers have also explored the concept of willful blindness. See, e.g., Kevin
Lynch, Willful ignorance and self-deception, 173 Phil. Stud. 505 (2016); Jan Wieland, Willful Ignorance and
Bad Motives, 84 Erkenn 1409 (2019).
9
I say “in fact” because WB is most often applied to the question whether D’s WB as to a relevant fact should
be treated as satisfying a statutory requirement that D have knowledge of that fact (e.g. that D is transporting
6
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for remaining merely reckless and for not acquiring knowledge, then as a matter of policy or
principle, it might be appropriate to treat defendant as harshly as a person who acted despite actual
knowledge of the relevant material fact.
The principal justification for WB is the equal culpability argument: Although most
reckless actors are less culpable than knowing actors, reckless actors who also are WB are roughly
equivalent in culpability to knowing actors. 10 Thus, just as “extreme indifference” or “depraved
heart” murder is a “recklessness plus” doctrine, requiring more culpability than reckless
manslaughter requires (but not requiring that the defendant knowingly or purposely cause a death),
WB as to an incriminating fact is a “recklessness plus” doctrine, requiring more culpability than
recklessness requires (but not requiring that the defendant know that the fact exists). The equal
culpability rationale is usually defended pursuant to a retributivist justification for punishment.
Accordingly, not all reckless actors are willfully blind. Suppose the actor has a suspicion
(but not knowledge) that the incriminating fact exists, but the reason she does not acquire full
knowledge is nonculpable—for example, it was impossible to acquire such knowledge, or the actor
justifiably feared for her safety if she were to attempt to acquire that knowledge. 11 Then the actor,
although reckless for taking the risk, would not be WB and could not be punished under that
doctrine. Moreover, in a number of situations, an actor’s decision not to investigate the risks of the
actor’s conduct is unjustified, yet the question of justification is a close one. In such cases, because

illegal drugs). But WB has sometimes been applied to the question whether D was WB as to a relevant legal
question. For example, if a criminal statute requires D’s knowledge that a campaign contribution is illegal,
then WB, if applicable, would permit conviction if D is merely WB as to that legal question. See U.S. v.
Reichert, 747 F.3d 445 at 450 (6th Cir. 2014) (proper to give WB instruction on question whether defendant
knew he was violating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); United States v. Henry, 888 F.3d 589, 601
(2nd Cir. 2018) (proper to give WB instruction on question whether defendant knew that the export of certain
materials was unlawful). Compare People v. Kuldeep Chatha, 33 N.E.3d 277, 287-288 (Ill. App. 2015)
(because defendant convenience store owner willingly complied with applicable laws and showed concern
about the legality of the sale of a product, defendant did not act with willful ignorance regarding its legality).
10
See Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 566; Sarch, Criminally Ignorant; Sarch, Willful ignorance in law and
morality, supra; Husak and Callender (supporting the equal culpability argument in some cases but also
arguing that WB defendants are sometimes less, and sometimes more, culpable than knowing defendants).
11
This was D’s claim in the Heredia case: She asserted that her suspicions about whether her car contained
drugs were first aroused while she was driving on a highway, but at that point, it was unsafe to stop and
investigate. Similarly, if the friend of a drug dealer fears violence if she or he investigates the facts, that is a
nonculpable (or only modestly culpable) reason, even if the defendant’s fear is insufficient to establish a full
defense of duress.
The majority in Heredia purported to exclude liability when defendant has a nonculpable reason for
not confirming the truth of her suspicion: the majority interprets its requirement of “deliberate avoidance” of
the truth as excluding “[a] decision influenced by coercion, exigent circumstances or lack of meaningful
choice.” 483 F.3d at 920. But the scope of this exclusion is unclear, as the concurring opinion notes. Id. at
928.
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the decision is almost justifiable, the actor might be reckless but might not be as culpable as a
knowing actor. 12
Policy justifications for employing WB to expand criminal liability for crimes requiring
knowledge also include the supposed difficulties of proving knowledge and the concern that whitecollar defendants are especially likely to exploit these difficulties through strategies of “plausible
deniability.” 13 These rationales, insofar as they emphasize pragmatic proof difficulties and the risk
that culpable actors will not be adequately deterred, are usually understood to be part of a forwardlooking, consequentialist justification for punishment.
C.

Preliminary conceptual issues

“Knowledge” of some proposition P, as the concept is used in the criminal law, requires
both a belief that P and that P is true. 14 I cannot know that the goods are stolen if I do not believe
that they are; nor can I know that they are stolen if, although I believe that they are, in fact they are
not. 15 Thus, the terms “knowledge” and “knowingly” are not simply forms of mens rea (even
See Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, at 102-103 (offering an example in which a drug manufacturer declines to
investigate the risks of a drug to a small number of patients because the delay that such a study would entail
would preclude a large number of patients from obtaining the immediate and substantial benefits from the
drug; even if the decision not to investigate is not justifiable, it is “nearly justified” and thus not equivalent
in culpability to distributing the drug while knowing that a small number of patients will suffer severe harm).
13
See J.S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1487, 1540 (2019). See also Jed Rakoff,
The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, NY Rev. of Books (Jan. 9,
2014); United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) (“To allow the most clever, inventive,
and sophisticated wrongdoers to hide behind a constant and conscious purpose of avoiding knowledge of
criminal misconduct would be an injustice in its own right”).
14
And the same is true of “awareness” that P or “consciousness” that P. I cannot be aware that it is raining if
it is not. Perhaps the same is also true of analogous statements about risk: perhaps I cannot know or be aware
that there is a 10% risk that P unless there really is such a risk. See Alexander Sarch, Review of Findlay
Stark, Culpable Carelessness, 12 Crim L. & Phil. 725, 727-728 (2018) (characterizing awareness in all of
these contexts as “factive”). But the notion of a “real” risk that P is much more elusive and controversial than
the notion that P itself “really” is the case. I can know or be aware that it is raining only if it really is raining.
But does it follow that I can know or be aware that it might be raining only if it “really” might be raining?
There is also disagreement about whether and how the concept of a real risk can be elucidated. Compare Eric
A. Johnson, Is the Idea of Objective Probability Incoherent?, 29 L. & PHIL. 419, 428-29 (2010); Robinson,
Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of
Risk-Creation Offenses, 4 Theor. Inq. L. 367-396 (2002); and Westen, "The Ontological Problem of 'Risk'
and 'Endangerment' in Criminal Law," in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law 304-27 (R. A. Duff
and S. P. Green, eds. Oxford University Press, 2011) with the following skeptical views about “real” risk:
Alexander & Ferzan, Crime and Culpability 29-31 (2009); and Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore,
Negligence in the Air, 3 Theor. Inq. L. 333, 358 (2002).
15
Philosophers plausibly assert that in ordinary language, knowledge requires more than this: it requires that
the belief is justified in some manner, e.g., based on the evidence available to the defendant. But it is unclear
12
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though they are so treated in the Model Penal Code and many state criminal codes). Rather, they
are useful shorthand terms by which a legislature (or court) can require both a mens rea (of belief)
and an actus reus (the truth of the matter believed). 16 It is much simpler to prohibit “knowingly
possessing stolen property” than to prohibit “possessing stolen property, believing that it is in one’s
possession and that it is stolen.” 17
Nevertheless, it is unclear, both in ordinary language and in the criminal law, what
constitutes a belief that P, and what this requires with respect to either the degree of the actor’s
confidence that P is true or the actor’s subjective estimate of the probability that P. 18 Moreover, it
is also unclear how specific, conscious, and occurrent an actor’s cognitive state with respect to P
must be in order to qualify as a belief that P. 19 Consider some examples:

whether criminal law requires this additional element of justification. See Simons, Rethinking Mental States,
72 B.U. L.Rev. at 542 n. 267; Husak and Callendar, at 48 (“The conception of justification typically employed
by philosophers is idealized, and may be unsuitable for purposes of imposing criminal liability.”); Findlay
Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law, pp. 128-140 (Cambridge
2016); Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, at 8.
16
See Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L.Rev. at 542 n. 267; Stark, p. 137.
17
A related question is whether WB can apply when a defendant mistakenly believes that an incriminating
fact exists. More precisely, the doctrinal question is whether WB permits attempt liability in the following
category of cases: D believes the incriminating fact to be true, but it is not; and the governing attempt law
permits an attempt conviction because D intentionally engaged in the relevant conduct and had the required
mens rea (namely, belief) for a circumstance element of the completed crime. (Suppose D tries to buy illegal
drugs or stolen property from E who turns out to be an undercover agent, and E offers an innocent product
or nonstolen property as part of the sting operation.) In principle, there is no reason why WB should not be
applied here, and some cases have so held. See, e.g., United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2006)
(allowing a conviction of conspiring to commit money laundering on a WB theory even though D was the
victim of a sting operation). But see Sarch, Equal Culpability, at 281 n. 26.
18
Some philosophers treat beliefs and “credences” as conceptually linked: X believes that P just in case X
has a sufficiently high “credence” that P, where a credence represents X’s subjective probability or
confidence level toward the proposition P. Other philosophers treat the two ideas as conceptually distinct.
Under this second approach, it is possible both that X believes that P and that X assesses the probability that
P as quite small. Thus, if X estimates the chance that drugs are in his car as only 5%, the first view entails
that X does not believe that drugs are in his car; the second view leaves open the possibility that X actually
does believes that drugs are in his car despite X assessing the chance of this as only 5%. However, the second
view is also consistent with the conclusion that it is irrational for X to simultaneously believe that X but have
a very low credence that X. See Elizabeth Jackson, The relationship between belief and credence, Philos.
Compass 2020; 15:e12688. https:///doi/org/10.1111/phc3.12668; Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", § 2.4, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/ Whether and when the criminal law should impose liability on actors
who hold such irrational beliefs is an important question.
19
On the question whether an actor’s beliefs must be “occurrent” (i.e., occupying the actor’s mind at the time
of action), rather than merely dispositional (beliefs that the actor could very quickly bring to the forefront, if
asked), see Schwitzgebel, supra; Stark, ch. 4; Sarch, Review of Stark, Culpable Carelessness, 12 Crim L &
Phil. 725 (2017); Simons, When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 97 (2011). A similar
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•

Driver D1’s phone is on the passenger seat. While D1 is driving, the phone rings. He
instinctively picks it up. The law prohibits knowingly using a cell phone while driving. Has
D1 violated the law? Presumably he has, even if the thought, “I am now using a cell phone”
never crosses his mind and is thus not an occurrent belief.

•

Driver D2 exceeds the speed limit and credibly claims that she did not look at the
speedometer. Rather, she simply kept pace with the speed that most other drivers were
traveling. D2 admits that she knows that almost all drivers speed but also credibly states
that she didn’t think about that when she was driving above the speed limit. Did D2
knowingly exceed the speed limit? In mens rea terms, did she believe that she was
exceeding the speed limit?

•

Driver D3 brings his briefcase to his car and drives to work. Minutes earlier, he knowingly
placed a loaded gun in the briefcase because he planned to go later to target practice. He is
stopped while speeding and also charged with the crime of knowingly carrying a loaded
gun in public. If he credibly testifies that he wasn’t thinking about the gun while driving,
does this demonstrate that he did not violate the loaded gun law? It seems not. On the other
hand, if a passenger in the car asked him where his gun was and he mistakenly believed it
was still at home, presumably he is not violating the law. And similarly if he had loaded
the gun a year ago but forgot he had done so. 20

question is whether the law should only take account of an actor’s “explicit” beliefs rather than “implied”
beliefs that the actor could swiftly derive from explicit beliefs. See Schwitzgebel, supra, § 2.2.1.
The Model Penal Code and many penal codes that rely upon the MPC use a variety of terms to refer
to cognitive requirements—including (1) knowledge, awareness, consciousness; (2) belief; and (3)
recklessness or suspicion. The first category of terms is “factive” (see Sarch, Review, supra): each term
requires both a cognitive state of mind and also that the proposition believed is true. (I can’t be aware, or
conscious of the fact, that it is sunny outside unless it is.) The first category also seems to require a greater
degree of self-awareness, and perhaps a more occurrent mental state, than the second category, of belief. But
it is doubtful that legislators and courts who employ these different cognitive mental states intend to draw
fine distinctions in degrees of consciousness of one’s own beliefs.
20
See Husak, Negligence, belief, blame and criminal liability: The special case of forgetting. 5 Crim. L. &
Phil. 199 (2011); Simons, Culpable Indifference; Simons, When Is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable?.
If D has forgotten a relevant fact at the time D commits the actus reus of an offense, presumably D
cannot be punished for a crime requiring knowledge of that fact. But sometimes D will, at the relevant time,
have dispositional or latent knowledge (but not occurrent) knowledge of the fact. Should this be sufficient to
satisfy a knowledge requirement?
Another type of example explores what it means to believe that one is (recklessly) posing a risk of
harm:
Driver D4 becomes engrossed in a conversation with his chatty friend while driving, and therefore
does not notice a pedestrian in his path. His car injures the pedestrian. D4 admits that he knows that
when he is engrossed in a conversation, he pays much less attention to the risks on the road.
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D.

Different versions of WB

It is time to examine more closely some other formulations of WB that courts have adopted
or commentators have suggested.
The Supreme Court’s Global-Tech patent law decision offers a generalization of the WB
doctrine in federal criminal cases:
[The WB doctrine contains] two basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.21
The Court’s opinion also emphasizes that neither negligence nor recklessness is sufficient for WB.
However, the federal courts of appeals have offered somewhat different versions of WB.
(State court decisions endorsing WB are more rare. 22) I will address four variations.
1. Motive to avoid criminal liability. Perhaps the most significant explicit variation in the
case law concerns the breadth of the second prong. Is it sufficient that the defendant chose to remain
in ignorance, or is it also necessary that the defendant’s motive in so choosing was to avoid criminal
liability? Courts and commentators disagree about whether this additional motive is required.23 If

Is D4 reckless, i.e., aware of a substantial risk that his conduct might cause harm? An affirmative answer is
problematic: it might convert almost all negligent inadvertence cases into recklessness cases.
21
563 U.S. at 769.
22
State court decisions endorsing WB include Salomon v. State, 126 So.3d 1185, 1185-87 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012); People v. Chatha, 2015 IL App (4th) 130652, 33 N.E.3d 277; Mefford v. State, 51 N.E.3d 327 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016); McCullough v. State, 769 S.E.2d 138 (Ga. App. 2015); Steward v. State, 218 Md. App. 550,
98 A.3d 362 (2014). By contrast, North Carolina rejects WB. See State v. Bogle, 376 S.E.2d 745, 746 (N.C.
1989).
23
The following federal circuits appear to require an additional motive of this sort: First Circuit (see United
States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2008)); Eleventh Circuit (see United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d
1274, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (defendant must purposely avoid learning all the facts “in order to have a defense
in the event of a subsequent prosecution”). Georgia also seems to require this additional motive. See
McCullough, supra. The Ninth Circuit does not require an additional motive. See Heredia, supra. For further
discussion, see Sarch, Wilful Ignorance in Law and Morality, p. 4; Husak & Callendar, at 40 (endorsing a
motivational condition).
It is not clear whether the D.C. Circuit recognizes the WB doctrine at all. See United States v. AlstonGraves, 435 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Global-Tech states that all federal circuits, with the possible exception
of the District of Columbia, endorse the WB doctrine. 563 U.S. at 769 n. 9. For further discussion of the
differences in approaches in different federal circuits, see Sarch, Willful Ignorance, Culpability, and the
Criminal Law, supra. In more recent cases, these differences appear to have narrowed, perhaps because of
the influence of the Supreme Court’s Global-Tech decision.
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it is not required—and most formulations of WB, including the Supreme Court’s in Global-Tech, 24
do not require it—then the WB doctrine is quite broad indeed. For example, even if the defendant’s
reason for not inquiring further into suspicious facts is a need to avoid physical harm, 25 the basic
formulation in Global-Tech would be satisfied. At the very least, it would be sensible to require
that the defendant culpably decided or chose to remain in ignorance, even if we do not require that
that culpability be based on the defendant desiring to avoid criminal liability. As Deborah Hellman
has pointed out, a lawyer or doctor should not be considered WB if, out of professional obligation,
the lawyer does not investigate her doubts about her client’s planned testimony, or the doctor does
not investigate his doubts about whether his patient is illegally reselling prescribed medications. 26
2. Affirmative steps v. psychological avoidance. A second possible variation concerns
whether, in choosing to avoid criminal liability, the defendant must have taken affirmative steps
(such as destroying documents or instructing another person not to inquire) or merely must have
made a decision not to inquire further (which courts characterize as “psychological avoidance”). 27
The Supreme Court in Global-Tech seems to require affirmative steps. 28 However, the Seventh
Circuit has clearly stated that psychological avoidance suffices. 29 This approach is potentially
However, although Global-Tech does not explicitly recognize this motive requirement, it emphasizes the
existence of such a motive when analyzing the facts of the case and concluding that the evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate WB: “On the facts of this case, we cannot fathom what motive [defendant’s CEO]
could have had for withholding this information other than to manufacture a claim of plausible deniability in
the event that his company was later accused of patent infringement.” 563 U.S. at 771.
25
See Heredia, supra. Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, at 90, offers a similar example in which it would be
dangerous to the defendant and his family to investigate whether his tenant is manufacturing drugs.
26
Deborah Hellman, Willfully Blind for Good Reason, 3 Crim. L. & Phil. 301 (2009). Sarch offers a similar
example of a non-professional obligation: a parent chooses not to investigate an adult child’s suspicious
package in order not to damage a recently repaired relationship. Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, at 92.
27
See Sarch, Wilful Ignorance in Law and Morality.
28
The Court concludes that the Federal Circuit departed from proper WB standards “in demanding only
‘deliberate indifference’ [to the risk]” and in failing to require “active efforts.” 563 U.S. at 770. The Court
also refers in a footnote to “parties … who take deliberate steps to remain ignorant.” Id. at 768 n. 8.
29
See United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 782-783 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted):
Evidence of deliberate ignorance can be placed into two general categories: evidence of “overt
physical acts,” and evidence of “purely psychological avoidance.” … The first category … is
generally the easy case, because there is evidence the defendant physically acted to avoid
knowledge. … The second category, psychological avoidance, is more troublesome. The act in this
category is a mental act—“a cutting off of one's normal curiosity by an effort of will.” ... The
difficulty in a psychological avoidance case—one without any outward physical manifestation of
an attempt to avoid facts—lies in distinguishing between a defendant's mental effort of cutting off
curiosity, which would support an ostrich instruction, and a defendant's simple lack of mental effort,
or lack of curiosity, which would not support an ostrich instruction. … There is generally no way to
peer directly into the defendant's thought process to determine whether he or she has become
suspicious and then dismissed the uncomfortable thought for fear of its consequences. (citations
omitted)
24
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extremely broad. To be sure, treating an omission to inquire further as sufficient for WB is not as
problematic as punishing for an omission simpliciter: in almost all cases, the defendant still must
have engaged in some affirmative action (such as transporting illicit items or filing false reports)
as the actus reus of the underlying offense. But it remains troubling that under the Seventh Circuit
approach, the “deliberate avoidance” prong can be satisfied merely upon proof that the defendant
decided not to inquire—for example, by not asking questions that might have confirmed
defendant’s suspicions.
3. Threshold degree of risk of which defendant must be aware. A third possible variation,
but one that is not clearly discussed in the case law, is to require that the defendant perceive a
specified threshold degree of risk under the first prong. Is it sufficient that the defendant perceives
any risk that the incriminating fact exists? Is it necessary that the defendant believes the risk is more
than 50%? Close to a certainty?
The legal standard most often employed is that the defendant must be aware of a “high
probability” that the fact exists. (This language is also used in the Model Penal Code definition of

In United States v. Tantchev, 916 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), the court reasoned:
[W]e must remember the instruction is aimed at defendants acting like fabled ostriches who bury
their heads in the sand. We do not, if we may add to the metaphorical menagerie, require every
defendant to act like Curious George. Accordingly, courts must be careful, lest we obliterate the
already thin line between avoidance, which is criminal, and indifference, which “cannot be
punished.”
However, in U.S. v. Macias, 786 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J), the court was skeptical that
“psychological avoidance” could suffice for WB:
The government … muddies the waters by offering, as an equivalent to “deliberate indifference,”
“psychological efforts” consisting of “cutting off ... one's normal curiosity by an effort of will.” That
sounds like judge playing psychologist; no matter, for there indeed are circumstances in which a
failure to ask questions is unnatural—a ducking of responsibility, a violation of duty, and perhaps
therefore the equivalent of taking evasive action to avoid confirming one's suspicions. … [“Cutting
off curiosity] is a dispensable phrase … not only because of its air of folk psychology but also
because American law is complicated enough without adding epicycles to every doctrinal formula.
The author of this opinion pleads guilty to having used the phrase in United States v. Giovannetti
[supra].
The court concluded that defendant had no need to know the source of the money he was paid to smuggle
from the United States to Mexico, and thus the defendant did not act with deliberate ignorance about a drug
smuggling operation by failing to inquire.
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knowledge. 30) Unfortunately, “high probability” is typically not defined, 31 so it is not clear whether
this is satisfied by, say, a 20% probability, or 40%, or whether instead the perceived probability
must be greater than 50%, or even a near certainty. I believe it is, well, highly probable, indeed
nearly certain, that the drafters of the Model Penal Code intended that “aware of a high probability”
would require the actor to believe that the probability is at least greater than 50%. 32 After all, the
MPC carefully distinguishes knowledge (thus defined as including awareness of a high probability)
from recklessness; but to be reckless, the actor only needs to be conscious of a “substantial” risk
that an incriminating fact exists, not a “highly probable” risk. Regrettably, “substantial” risk is also
undefined. Still, “highly probable” must be greater than, and perhaps significantly (substantially?)
greater than, “substantial.”
I delve into these devilish details because I doubt that most courts applying the “aware of
a high probability” language realize that the American Law Institute members who drafted and
approved this language probably intended to require awareness of a very high probability, at least
50% and perhaps more.
4. Negative criterion: Defendant believes that incriminating fact does not exist. A fourth
variation found in many of the cases is a negative criterion: The state may not rely on WB if it is
shown that D actually believed that the incriminating fact was not true—for example, D believed
the suitcase did not contain drugs or that the property he received was not stolen. In effect, this

MPC § 2.02(7) provides that knowledge of a fact “is established if a person is aware of a high probability
of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” A number of courts, including the Supreme
Court in Global-Tech, characterize this as the MPC’s version of the WB doctrine. See Global-Tech, 563 U.S.
at 767. But this characterization is highly misleading, for two reasons. First, this MPC provision does not
include the second prong of the WB doctrine, the requirement that the defendant chose not to inquire or
deliberately avoided knowledge. And second, the MPC includes the “unless” clause, a negative element that
is not recognized by all courts employing WB.
31
In Global-Tech, the Court does state, in its preliminary discussion of the WB doctrine, the rationale that
defendants may not escape liability “by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts
that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.” 563 U.S. at 766. It also states that a WB defendant “can
almost be said to have actually known the critical facts,” whereas “a reckless defendant is one who merely
knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of such wrongdoing.” Id. at 769-770. The Court concludes that
the Federal Circuit departed from proper WB standards by permitting a finding of knowledge “when there is
merely a ‘known risk’ that the induced acts are infringing.” Id. at 770. This suggests that the Court believes
a threshold higher than MPC recklessness is required for WB.
32
There is some evidence from the MPC Commentaries that “high probability” was meant to be considerably
more than a 50% probability: the Commentaries note the definition in Ohio’s code that knowledge is satisfied
when the result or circumstance is “probable” and then remark that this definition is “more expansive” than
the MPC position. Model Penal Code § 2.02 cmt at 248 n.43 (1985).
30
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amounts to a third, albeit negative, prong in the WB test. 33 This additional prong is also found in
the Model Penal Code definition of knowledge that was just discussed.
But this third prong is controversial and difficult to justify, especially if the required
threshold probability under the first prong is greater than 50%--i.e., if the defendant must believe
that the incriminating fact is more than 50% likely to be true. 34 Thus, suppose Ben is aware of a
“high probability” that a package in Ben’s possession contains illegal drugs because he thinks that
the chance that it contains drugs is 70% (and Ben deliberately chooses not to find out for sure). The
negative criterion provides that Ben cannot be guilty of WB if Ben nevertheless believes that the
package does not contain drugs. But how could the negative criterion ever apply to someone with
Ben’s beliefs? Can a person believe that there is a 70% chance that a fact exists yet at the same
time believe that the fact does not exist? This borders on incoherence. 35
However, this incoherence difficulty does not arise if the threshold under the first prong is
less than 50%. Thus, suppose Jen believes that there is a 40% chance that drugs are in the package
(and Jen deliberately chooses not to find out for sure). The negative criterion provides that Jen
cannot be guilty under WB if Jen believes that the package does not contain drugs. In this scenario,
Jen’s two beliefs—namely, (1) that there is a 40% chance that the package contains drugs and (2)
that the package does not contain drugs—are quite compatible, at least if it is possible to hold belief
(2) while also having a strong suspicion that (2) is not the case.
Still, although this second scenario is less problematic than the first, it raises a further
difficulty. How is this second scenario different from a standard WB case? All WB cases involve
a suspicion that an incriminating fact might be true. Don’t many of them involve a mere or lowerprobability suspicion, in which the defendant believes that the fact might be true but does not
believe that its probability is greater than 50%? The lingering question is why the negative criterion
is sensible even here. Why should it matter so much whether the defendant who suspects that P
also forms the contrary belief that P is not the case? Consider Ken, who, like Jen, believes there is
a 40% chance that the package contains drugs. But suppose Ken, unlike Jen, does not form the
ultimate belief that the package does not contain drugs. Thus, Ken does not satisfy the negative

The following cases include this third, negative element, based on the Model Penal Code’s “unless” clause,
§ 2.02(7), quoted in footnote 34: United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1314 (11th Circ. 2016); United States
v. Henry, 888 F.3d 589, 600 (2nd Cir. 2018).
34
For discussions of this problem, see Simons, Should the Model Penal Code, supra, at 187; Cole, Knowledge
and Belief as Criminal Law Mental States, 16 Ohio St J. Crim. L. 441, 444 n. 17 (2019.
35
Although this borders on incoherence, one possible explanation is that one might have a credence greater
than 50% that P, yet at the same time disbelieve P or have a belief that not-P. Whether beliefs and credences
can oppose one another in this manner is a question about which philosophers disagree. See Jackson, supra.
33
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criterion and is still WB, while Jen is not WB. Does it really make sense to punish Ken (who is no
relation to the author) for knowing drug possession but not Jen? 36
Other possible variations exist, 37 but these four demonstrate that the scope of WB depends
significantly on precisely how it is formulated.
E.

Problems with WB as applied in recent cases

Notwithstanding the reasons of principle and policy that support the WB doctrine, the
doctrine is highly problematic in practice. Researching hundreds of recent WB cases reveals a range
of difficulties, with respect to jury instructions and the reasoning in judicial opinions. Some of these
difficulties flow from the courts’ employing the four different WB criteria just noted, or variations
of these criteria. But other problems have also arisen.
1. Failure to define knowledge clearly. Courts do not define with much clarity the meaning
and scope of statutory “knowledge” requirements. This is a serious problem. Jury instructions
defining “knowledge” are frequently confusing or confused. 38 And the requisite object of

It might be argued that if Ken believes there is a 40% chance that a package contains drugs, he must also
believe there is a 60% chance that it does not contain drugs, in which case he must believe, simpliciter, that
it does not contain drugs. But I do not think that the conclusion follows. Moreover, if it does follow, then the
negative criterion that some but not all courts endorse would apply in every WB case in which the perceived
probability that an incriminating fact exists is less than 50%. I am doubtful that courts that adopt the negative
criterion intend to apply it that widely.
37
A fifth possible variation concerns the mens rea that the defendant must possess with respect to prong two.
Must the defendant’s acts or omissions that result in the defendant’s ignorance of the truth be for the purpose
of avoiding or ignoring the truth, or is it sufficient that D acts in a way that she knows will result in her
ignorance? Or is mere negligence sufficient? Courts appear to uniformly require purpose. See Sarch, Wilful
ignorance in law and morality, supra, pp 2-4; Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, p. 20.
38
The following standard jury instruction is adequate. 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 17:04 (6th ed. 2020)
(“The term “knowingly”, as used in these instructions to describe the alleged state of mind of Defendant,
means that [he] [she] was conscious and aware of [his] [her] [action] [omission], realized what [he] [she]
was doing or what was happening around [him] [her], and did not [act] [fail to act] because of ignorance,
mistake, or accident.”).
However, one common definition is confusing because it ignores or mischaracterizes the important
question, “knowledge about what?” See, e.g., U.S. D.Ct. Me. 2019 rev. to Pattern Crim Jury Instructions §
2.15 (“The word “knowingly,” as that term has been used from time to time in these instructions, means that
the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident.”) A very similar
instruction was given in United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 206 (5th Cir.2013). This type of instruction
is highly misleading, because it focuses on whether defendant engaged in an act knowingly, rather than on
what is almost always at issue when a defendant asserts a lack of knowledge: whether the defendant acted
knowingly with respect to a material circumstance of the crime (e.g. whether goods were stolen) or with
respect to a required result element (e.g. whether defendant would cause injury or death to a victim). Cf.
MPC § 2.02 (differentiating three potential objects of a mental state: conduct, circumstances, and results).
36
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knowledge is often quite unclear, especially in statutes with multiple actus reus elements.39 For
example, is it sufficient that defendant knows the facts that make his conduct illegal, or must
defendant also know (or correctly believe) that his conduct is illegal?
2. Confusion about whether WB is a criterion distinct from knowledge. Courts sometimes
state that WB permits an “inference” of knowledge; but this formulation confuses the view that
WB is an alternative, independent ground for criminal liability with a second and more modest
view, that evidence that D was WB is sometimes sufficient for the fact-finder to conclude that D
actually possessed knowledge. On the second view, WB is not an alternative to knowledge as a
basis for criminal liability. 40
3. Failure to distinguish WB from recklessness. Courts do a satisfactory job of explaining
that negligence is insufficient for WB, 41 but in many cases, they fail to explain that recklessness is
also insufficient. 42 Global-Tech was a salutary decision in this respect because it does carefully

For a recent example of these complexities, see Rehaif v United States, 588 U.S. _ (2019).
See, e.g., United States v. Figuieroa-Lugo, 793 F.3d 179, 192 (1st Cir. 2015) (“contrary to Figueroa's
contention that the instruction allowed the jury to convict him of a [statutory] violation … by a less stringent
requirement than “knowingly,” a willful blindness instruction is one way in which a jury can permissibly
find that a defendant acted knowingly.”); United States v. Juarez, 866 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1984); Hawkins v. State, 830 S.E.2d 301, 310 (Ct. App. Ga.
2019). Thus, in Hawkins, the jury instruction provided that the element of knowledge may be “inferred” from
WB, and the court stated that the instruction properly clarified that this was a permissive rather than
mandatory inference; but then the court switched to the alternative view, stating that “it is the law that the
element of knowledge may be satisfied by a finding of deliberate indifference.”
This confusion of the two distinct views is discussed in Husak & Callender, at 42-44; Sarch,
Criminally Ignorant, pp. 12-13. A forthcoming article endorses the “mere evidence” view: Gilchrist, Willful
Blindness as Mere Evidence (September 10, 2019), Loyola L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available at:
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3690351 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3690351
41
Thus, it is improper to use “reasonable person” language in a WB jury instruction, United States v. Denson,
689 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012), or to use language that defendant “should have known better,” United States v.
Lopez-Diaz, 794 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 2015). But see United States v. Singh, 222 F.3d 6, 11–12 (1st
Cir.2000) (reasoning that WB instruction was proper “if the government adduces evidence that warning signs
existed sufficiently to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry notice (and, thus, sufficient to permit a fact
finder to infer conscious avoidance of guilty knowledge).”).
42
See, e.g., United States v. Reichert, supra; United States v. Ross, 502 F.3d 521, 527 (6th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Henry, supra (although court’s opinion requires more than negligence or recklessness, jury
instruction does not require more than recklessness). Indeed, in United States v. Anthony, 545 F.3d 60 (1st
Cir. 2008), the First Circuit stated that it was not error to omit a reference to “recklessness” as insufficient.
However, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech, which stated that recklessness is insufficient
for WB, many courts have included a clarification to that effect. See United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d
471, 480 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Goffer, 531 Fed. Appx. 8, 20-21 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that
recklessness is insufficient, but also finding that the jury instruction was adequate even though it did not
explicitly so provide; the instruction did require proof that defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what
would otherwise have been obvious, and required proof of more than negligence).
39
40
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distinguish recklessness from WB, and some recent decisions draw this distinction. 43 Nevertheless,
many decisions since Global-Tech fail to mention this important distinction. 44 Moreover, even
when courts instruct that recklessness is insufficient, they typically do not explain what
recklessness means and how it differs from WB.
4. Failure to clarify the first prong of WB. Courts do a poor job of explaining the first
element of WB—specifically, how much suspicion D must have that the incriminating fact
exists. 45 The language “high probability” is most often used, yet it is almost never defined. In the
rare cases in which a further explanation is offered, the explanation is usually not very helpful. 46
To be sure, courts sometimes emphasize the relevance of “red flags,” but they do not clarify what
these terms mean. 47

See, e.g., United States v. Farrell, 921 F.3d 116, 122-23 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d
309, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2014).
44
See, e.g. United States v. Henry, 888 F.3d 589 (2d Cir. 2018), upholding the trial court’s instruction
informing jurors that WB may not be shown merely because defendant was “negligent, foolish, or mistaken,”
but not mentioning that recklessness is inadequate. Part of the court’s instruction also confusingly described
the requirements of WB, for it seems to suggest that recklessness (which the MPC defines in part as
“conscious disregard of a substantial risk”) is sufficient for WB: “If you find that the defendant was aware
of a high probability that exporting the ablative materials without a license was unlawful and that the
defendant acted with deliberate disregard of that fact, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly and
willfully.” Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
45
In some cases, courts do not even require any level of suspicion. See United States v. Mathauda, 740 F.3d
565, 568-569 (11th Cir. 2014) (requiring government to prove either that defendant purposely contrived to
avoid learning all of the facts, or that defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact and consciously
avoided confirming that fact).
46
See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 716 (2d Cir. 2019 (WB can be established “where a
defendant's involvement in the criminal offense may have been so overwhelmingly suspicious that the
defendant's failure to question the suspicious circumstances establishes the defendant's purposeful
contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge”); United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 322 (1st Cir.1986) (using
the language “the likelihood of wrongdoing”); United States v. Chavez-Alvarez, 594 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th
Cir. 2010) (“[A] jury may find willful blindness only if the defendant was aware of facts that put him on
notice that criminal activity was probably afoot…”). In Juarez, supra, the court seemed to require more than
awareness of a high probability: the state must present “facts that support an inference that the … defendant
subjectively knew his act to be illegal.” 866 F.3d 622 at 631. In United States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58, 78 (2d.
Cir. 2016), the court clarified “high probability” as follows: “A factual predicate may be established where a
defendant's involvement in the criminal offense may have been so overwhelmingly suspicious that the
defendant's failure to question the suspicious circumstances establishes the defendant's purposeful
contrivance to avoid guilty knowledge.” In United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1986), the
court gave some helpful guidance: “[I]t takes a fairly large amount of knowledge to prompt further
investigation for the purpose of this instruction; to permit an inference of knowledge from just a little
suspicion is to relieve the prosecution of its burden of showing every element of the case beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
47
See Tantchev, supra, 916 F.3d at 653; United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 278 (2d. Cir. 2011).
43
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5. Failure to clarify the second prong of WB. Courts give varying and often inadequate
explanations of the second element of WB—of the meaning of “conscious” or “deliberate
avoidance” or “deliberate ignorance” or “deliberately blinding oneself” or “purposeful
contrivance.” For example, is a merely psychological effort not to inquire sufficient? Is some
affirmative conduct required (e.g. instructing an employee not to inquire)? One court merely
required that the defendant acted with “deliberate disregard to the [suspicious] facts,” 48 phrasing
that is very similar to the Model Penal Code definition of recklessness in § 2.02(2)(c), requiring
only that the defendant “conscious disregard a substantial and unjustified risk.”
6. Precluding WB instruction when evidence supports only actual or no knowledge. Courts
sometimes state that a WB instruction should not be given when the evidence points solely to actual
knowledge, 49 or points either to actual knowledge or to no knowledge, 50 but this approach is
problematic. Why not permit the prosecution to argue actual knowledge and WB in the alternative
in all cases? 51
7. Endorsing the problematic negative criterion. Most recent jury instructions include the
negative criterion: defendant is not guilty if she believed the incriminating fact did not exist—e.g.,
if she believed that the package did not contain illegal drugs. This criterion is problematic for
reasons discussed earlier.
8. Tolerating erroneous WB instructions. Courts frequently find that instructions on WB
contain errors yet they almost never reverse convictions. Quite often, they find that the state offered
sufficient evidence of knowledge, rendering the instructional error harmless. 52 Although appellate
courts often warn district courts that WB instructions should be given rarely or with caution, 53 their
bark is much worse than their bite.
F.

Analysis

United States v. Henry, 888 F.3d 589, 601 (2d Cir. 2018).
See United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2009) (inappropriate to give WB instruction
“when the evidence presented at trial provides the jury with only a binary choice between actual knowledge
and innocence”); Tantchev, supra, at 654.
50
See, e.g., United States v. Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir. 2015).
51
See United States v. Wert–Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 257 (3d Cir.2000) (“[B]ecause the jury could selectively
discredit some of the evidence in the prosecution's case, the existence of evidence that points to actual
knowledge does not preclude consideration of other evidence that points to a finding that [the defendant] was
wilfully blind.”).
52
See, e.g., United States v. Roussel, 705 F.3d 184, 191–192 (5th Cir.2013) (finding harmless error because
there was sufficient evidence of actual knowledge); Little, supra (same); Salomon, supra (same).
53
See, e.g., United States v. Oloyede, 933 F.3d 302, 316 (4th Cir. 2019); Horchak v. State, 198 So.3d 905,
908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
48
49
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The discussion thus far provokes several important questions about the WB doctrine, both
as a matter of principle and as a matter of the law in action.
First, courts offer very little guidance to juries (or to each other) about the meaning of
critical terms such as knowledge, recklessness, high probability, and deliberate or conscious
avoidance. For example, most jury instructions require awareness of a “high probability” that the
inculpatory fact exists, yet it is not clear whether this refers to a probability greater than 50% (as
the MPC seems to contemplate), or to a probability much less than this.
Second, although it is perhaps understandable that courts do not wish to burden prosecutors
with having to prove a defendant’s guilt under a narrow definition of knowledge, the question
remains whether WB is an intelligible standard that satisfies the Goldilocks test: neither too
stringent, as knowledge might be, nor too relaxed, as recklessness might be (and as negligence
would certainly be). If WB is to be used, there is much to be said for a narrower version than the
standard endorsed in Global Tech. A good candidate for a narrower version would be the approach
adopted by some courts and requiring the following especially culpable motive: the defendant must
have chosen not to investigate further in order to avoid potential legal liability. Or, more broadly,
courts might simply require that the defendant chose not to investigate for a highly culpable
reason. 54
Third, it is fair to ask whether the Goldilocks game is worth the candle. Why not simply
use recklessness as the required mens rea in all the cases that now require proof of either WB or
knowledge? As a matter of policy, there is something to be said for this approach. 55 To be sure, one
concern about lowering the standard to recklessness is that this mens rea standard might be too
easily satisfied. If the threshold probability of risk for recklessness is low, permitting liability if the
defendant harbors any suspicion at all that the incriminating fact exists, then the scope of criminal
liability would be greatly enlarged. On the other hand, if recklessness is defined along the lines of

Sarch, Criminally Ignorant, Ch. 4, endorses a version of this test, as does Simons, Culpable Indifference,
at 248-253. Another possibility is for courts or legislatures to define knowledge as permitting a lower-level
credence than near certainty. Perhaps it should suffice that defendant believed that it was more likely than
not that the relevant incriminating fact existed. Under this approach, however, proportionality principles
should then require a lower punishment than if defendant believed that the incriminating fact was almost
certain to obtain.
55
See Robbins, supra, endorsing the substitution of recklessness for willful blindness. Robbins cites other
commentators sharing this view. Id. at 225 n. 21. See also Christopher Sherrin, Wilful Blindness: A Confused
and Unnecessary Basis for Criminal Liability, 47 U.B.C. L. Rev. 709 (2014) (arguing that recklessness should
be employed in lieu of wilful blindness in Canadian criminal law).
54
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the Model Penal Code, requiring a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding
person, 56 this significantly limits the scope of recklessness.
As a matter of legislative interpretation, however, it is understandable that courts have not
gone this far (at least not explicitly). Recklessness is not a commonly invoked mens rea category
in the federal criminal code, either in its explicit language or in its judicial adumbrations. Also,
perhaps federal courts feel more comfortable using the WB test of “recklessness plus deliberate
avoidance” because the “deliberate” or “conscious” avoidance requirement sounds rather similar
to the explicit language in federal statutes requiring that defendant act “willfully” or “knowingly.”
But this last argument is a slender reed to lean upon. Deliberate, conscious, or knowing avoidance
of the truth of an inculpatory proposition is hardly equivalent to knowledge of that proposition. The
mere fact that some aspect of defendant’s conduct is deliberate, knowing, or intentional is not nearly
enough to characterize defendant’s conduct as knowing with respect to a material element of the
offense. If I knowingly drive, and it turns out I am exceeding the speed limit (because, say, my
speedometer is broken), it hardly follows that I am knowingly exceeding the speed limit.
Of course, if a criminal statute requires recklessness rather than knowledge with respect to
a material element, the statute should impose a lesser punishment than would be justifiable if the
defendant had acted with knowledge. And for some crimes, perhaps the legislature should grade
degrees of the offense according to mens rea, creating an aggravated degree of the crime when a
defendant acts with knowledge and a lesser degree when he or she acts only with recklessness.
Fourth and finally, I believe that it is unwise at this stage of our understanding to make any
definitive judgment about which options to pursue—that is, about whether to (a) retain some
version of WB, and if so, which version; (b) insist on actual knowledge instead; or (c) lower the
mens rea to recklessness for certain crimes. The reason for caution is our ignorance. We simply do
not know how ordinary people (actual and potential jurors) and legal specialists (judges and
lawyers) interpret and apply terms such as recklessness, willful blindness, belief, and knowledge.
In defining and explaining these terms, how much precision is realistically achievable? How much
differentiation in mental state terms is practicable?
The critical questions here are accuracy, consistency, and distributive justice. With respect
to accuracy, we need to know whether the mens rea categories actually capture and express the
legal culpability and responsibility judgments that the law needs to make. With respect to
consistency, the question is the likelihood that different factfinders, or different judges, if presented
See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c): the risk that the reckless defendant consciously disregards “must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person would observe in the actor's situation.”
56
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with the same evidence, will reach the same results. In evaluating accuracy and consistency, we
must take account of the frequency of errors (false positives and false negatives) and must decide
the normative weight to be given to each type of error. And, last but not least, we need to consider
the distributive justice consequences of different legal rules. Does the WB doctrine facilitate the
prosecution of white-collar criminals who are especially well positioned to avoid criminal sanctions
when the law requires proof of knowledge? Many commentators answer in the affirmative. 57 On
the other hand, WB is quite frequently invoked in drug crime prosecutions, and the evidence is
overwhelming that such prosecutions disproportionately target Black and Latinx defendants.
Fortunately, in evaluating these questions, we are not writing on a clean slate. In recent
decades, a number of scholars have carefully investigated how ordinary people and legally trained
actors understand the language and concepts used in the law, including mens rea concepts. 58 For
example, in a recent series of articles (some of which I contributed to), scholars described empirical
examinations that they undertook of whether ordinary people are able to understand and apply the
Model Penal Code’s hierarchical culpability structure (purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence). 59 They discovered that when subjects were asked to sort concrete factual scenarios
See note [] supra. An example of the use of WB to defeat a white-collar criminal’s claim of plausible
deniability is U.S. v. Goffer, 531 Fed. Appx. 8, 19-20 (2d Cir. 2013). In this securities fraud prosecution,
defendant Kimelman claimed ignorance that Goffer, the source of non-public information about an upcoming
takeover, was an insider and also claimed ignorance that the information was illegally obtained. The court
rejected Kimelman’s argument that he did not consciously avoid knowledge of Goffer’s sources:
While [Goffer] and Kimelman were recruiting Slaine [a third party], Goffer told Slaine that he was
“better off not knowing where [his tips] were coming from.” Gov't Ex. 222. That way, Goffer
continued, if “someone from the government ever ask[ed] you where did [that tip] come from. You
[would] be like, I don't freakin' know where it came from.” Building on Goffer's (facetious) assertion
that his source was a construction worker, Kimelman added that it was a “[g]uy fixing that pothole
down there.” His additions to this conversation about the need for plausible deniability underscore
Kimelman's conscious avoidance of knowledge as to Goffer's source. The jury was entitled to hear
the conscious avoidance instruction.
58
See, e.g., Beattey RA, Fondacaro MR. The misjudgment of criminal responsibility. Behav Sci Law.
2018;36:457–469. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2354 (in a surprisingly high percentage of cases, individual
decision‐makers are likely to attribute the most culpable mental state (purpose) to defendants, even when
legal experts would judge the facts as depicting no more than negligent or reckless conduct); Kneer &
Bourgeois-Gironde, Mens rea ascription, expertise and outcome effects: Professional judges surveyed,
Cognition 169 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.08.008 (judges as well as laypeople are
sensitive to the Knobe effect: they are more likely to ascribe intentionality to conduct if the foreseen outcome
is viewed as negative rather than positive); [other].
59
Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene, and Rene Marois, Sorting Guilty
Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011) (concluding that experimental subjects do a good job of sorting cases
into MPC categories of negligence and purpose but a poor job of sorting cases into knowing or reckless and
of distinguishing these two categories); Matthew R. Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B.
Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Rene Marois, and Kenneth W. Simons, The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L.
Rev. 1327 (2014) (even when MPC definitions of recklessness and knowledge are improved, subjects have
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into one of these categories and also to assign a level of punishment for each scenario, subjects
were able to accurately and reliably distinguish between purposeful and knowing, between reckless
and negligent, and between negligent and blameless. Strikingly, however, subjects were unable to
distinguish reliably between knowing and reckless. This finding, and the findings of other studies, 60
have important implications for whether WB is a useful and viable criterion of criminal culpability,
either in general or in specific legal contexts.
Thus, it would be highly desirable if carefully designed studies (e.g. surveys of ordinary
people) were conducted, in order to determine whether improved definitions of mental state
categories such as knowledge, WB, and recklessness can satisfy the criteria of accuracy,
consistency, and distributive justice. 61
G.

Conclusion

For these reasons, courts should refrain from using the WB doctrine or WB instructions
until they have evidence that a narrow and precise version of WB can be understood by jurors and
can be consistently and fairly applied. If courts feel bound by precedent not to suspend use of the
WB doctrine, they should at least restrict WB to one of the narrow versions discussed above (e.g.,
requiring a motive to avoid criminality or a highly culpable reason for not investigating the facts).
One objection to this conclusion is a concern that eliminating the WB doctrine might cause
courts to explicitly or implicitly impose a less rigorous definition of knowledge. 62 If that were to
occur, then many of the problems with WB identified in this article would persist and would simply
be less visible. This is indeed a legitimate worry. But once again, an empirical analysis of how
great difficulty sorting cases accurately); Matthew R. Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B.
Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Kenneth W. Simons, Decoding Guilty Minds, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 241 (2018)
(although subjects can apply MPC mens rea framework in a manner largely congruent with MPC hierarchy,
they tend to regard recklessness as sufficient for punishment even in circumstances where legislatures and
courts tend to require knowledge).
60
See, e.g., Iris Vilares, Michael Wesley, Woo-Young Ahn, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen
D. Jones, Stephen J. Morse, Gideon Yaffe, Terry Lohrenz, & Read Montague, Predicting the KnowledgeRecklessness Distinction in the Human Brain, 14 Proc. of Nat. Acad. Sci. 3222 (2017) (results provide neural
evidence of a detectable difference in the mental state of knowledge in contrast to recklessness and suggest,
as a proof of principle, the possibility of inferring from brain data in which legally relevant category a person
belongs). [Obtain permission to cite Jones, Montague, & Yaffe, Detecting Mens Rea in the Brain, which
summarizes the Vilares et al study for a legal audience].
61
In his book-length treatment of WB, Sarch offers both an ideal criterion of WB (the “Restricted Equal
Culpability Thesis 4”) and several simpler versions of the criterion that he believes would be workable for
juries. See Sarch, Criminal Ignorance, at 110, 132-138. It would be instructive to see whether one of his
simpler versions could indeed be applied consistently and fairly.
62
I thank Jennifer Chacon for suggesting this concern.
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ordinary people and legal actors understand the mens rea term (here, knowledge) would go some
distance towards addressing the concern, especially if we were to employ that analysis to improve
the comprehensibility of jury instructions explaining the mens rea term.
A second objection to this conclusion is that there are practical limits to the legal system’s
ability to explain and consistently apply mens rea concepts and definitions such as knowledge,
recklessness, and WB. The perfect should not be the enemy of the good. All legal concepts and
definitions are capable of being misunderstood or inconsistently applied. Perhaps WB doctrine is
good enough and cannot realistically be improved. Perhaps WB is no worse, and no more
confusing, than the more basic concepts of recklessness and knowledge.
Perhaps. More empirical work certainly should be done to clarify the definitions of
recklessness and knowledge so that legal actors apply these mens rea terms accurately, consistently,
and fairly. Nevertheless, it is very likely that a rule permitting fact-finders to convict a defendant
on the basis of either WB or knowledge expands criminal liability relative to a rule requiring them
to find that the defendant acted with knowledge. Moreover, the use of the WB doctrine itself has
significantly expanded in recent decades. If we care about ensuring that criminal punishment is
proportional to a defendant’s culpability, we should pause the WB experiment and consider
carefully whether continued use of the WB doctrine is justifiable.
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